Aesthetics and its “End”

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Abstracts

The Author intends to show how the notion of “aura” which may be equated to “wonder-awe”, commonly regarded as the “origin of philosophy”, is what intimately connects the birth of aesthetics to that of philosophy, in Greece. The Author then examines key points in the development of “aesthetics” as a discipline by considering some of the most influential philosophers, both ancient (Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus) and modern/contemporary (from Kant to Heidegger). The gradual disappearance of the notion of “aura” in the history of the discipline is fundamental for understanding the “crisis” aesthetics suffered in the 1900s.

L’autore intende mostrare come la nozione di “aura” che può essere equiparata al “meraviglioso”, comunemente considerata come l’“origine della filosofia”, è ciò che lega intimamente la nascita dell’estetica a quella della filosofia, in Grecia. L’autore esamina poi i punti chiave nello sviluppo dell’“estetica” come disciplina considerando alcuni dei più influenti filosofi, antichi (Platone, Aristotele e Plotino) e moderni/contemporanei (da Kant a Heidegger). La graduale scomparsa della nozione di “aura” nella storia della disciplina è fondamentale per comprendere la “crisi” di cui soffre l’estetica nel Novecento.

Keywords

Aesthetics – Aura – History of Aesthetics – Philosophy
As I was searching for a beginning that would best fit the title, I realized that the most suitable one may be one that is referred to – whether correctly or incorrectly – as the early indication of the birth of Western thought. It is obviously aesthetics and its very unique history that we would like to examine here, but how can we deny that we should refer back to the much-celebrated birth of philosophy out of “wonder” and “awe”? In fact, wonder and awe are *not exclusive* to existence and to the sensory perception of the entity’s existence, to its coming into being out of nothing. Wonder and awe (as originators of philosophical reflection) are connected to the entity’s presence thanks to the invisible – albeit perceived and perceivable – *aura* that surrounds the entity and its manifestation. In turn, the aura is accompanied by the human being’s reaction (delight, curiosity, fear, astonishment, and wonder) as he, through his senses, exists *in* and *with the aura* before the entity (the reality). If this is true, then the relation which links the birth of philosophy to the ontology of beauty – and therefore to an area which, from the mid-1700s on, would become the field of aesthetics as a disciplinary identity – is at the same time ascertained and ancient, originary. Broadly speaking, the “aesthetics” dimension finds its place within the birth of philosophy and contributes to its own origination. In fact, is it not of great significance that, in many ways, the *aura* – which would come to hold such a powerful meaning for the world of aesthetics – would manifest itself at the *sheer* appearance of the entity? Consequently, the *aura* could be the originary wonder that attracts a humanity sensorially directed towards the entity as it becomes apparent. It is not something *more* but something
ineliminable; it is not something precisely connected to or dependent on a specific kind of entity, but rather the manner in which each entity becomes manifest. Accordingly, we should not underestimate the following: the reflection on the disappearance of the aura – and even on the necessity for the aura that circumfuses the entity to be ultimately destined to vanish – makes its appearance, maybe not by chance, at the height of the crisis of Western thought. In the second half of the twentieth century – and again perhaps not by mere chance – aesthetics (both discipline and contents) as well as the entire field of philosophy entered into a crisis. However, the former appears to have somewhat averted the decline that befell the field of philosophy by renouncing its originary phenomenological-auratic trait.

The perspective I have been trying to define thus far in relation to aesthetics, intended in a broad ontological sense, could be used to examine a 1934 study by Alfred Baeumler that in many ways represents the successful and concise convergence of theory and history of aesthetics. The first line reads, «Aesthetic reflection emerged in the presence of beauty, not art»¹. The meaning of the term reflection is not terminologically essential in this particular context, it simply points to the beginning of that particular thought that has been historically categorized as aesthetic and which has progressively come to occupy the domains of beauty and art. However, the real issue consists in the appearance of beauty, namely the manifestation of the entity circumfused with the aura, which, whether visible or invisible, generates a feeling of awe in the human being. Considering the discipline of aesthetics a reflection on the wondrousness of the entity which offers itself to the sensitivity (aesthesis), allows this very same sensitivity to become something that cannot be ex-

¹ A. Baeumler, *Aesthetik* (from the *Handbuch der Philosophie*, Abteilung I, Beitrag C), München-Berlin 1934; Oldenburg, München-Wien 1972², 3.
clusively directed towards the entity, but rather to the being intended as a place of origin of both entity and aura, a place of provenance of the visible/detectable as well as of the invisible/perceivable. Thus, the sensitivity we are referring to, that is literally affected by beauty, points to its essential, programmatic, and processual ontological trait—a trait that cannot be circumvented. In fact, it introduces the human being’s sensation into a dimension which, since the onset, is undoubtedly projected towards the invisible through a sort of natural experiencing of the transparency of the visible. Hence, sensitivity is intended as the transcendence, or better, the traversal of matter which has the power not only to engender but even lead from transparency to transfiguration, which, after all, is the true domain of art. Any attempt to steer art back to the discernibly sensorial-detectable phenomenon or to confine it to imitation delivers it to a plane that, while certainly more quantifiably realistic and observable, is also less free. The reference to freedom leads us to the issue of end, not only as conclusion but first and foremost as ultimate purpose, which inherently entails the potential for a conclusion.

Although Plato addresses beauty (kalôn) both as a concept and as a term in relation to many things and domains, the path we have embarked on allows us to examine only a few: the political (State), the pedagogical (individual education), and the erotic (Eros). Soul, life, and beauty are the key words that designate those territories. Nevertheless, this is where we begin to encounter an array of problems: beauty’s potential universality as well as its (equally potential) infinite manifestations may mislead us into believing that hierarchy does not play a pivotal role in life. However, the choice, the unfettered true possibility of choice, does originate from hierarchy which arranges the entities according to direction and meaning so that, Plato posits, the human being is able to navigate through what we may call
a *system of auras* in order to choose freely among the entities. It is as if the three above mentioned domains were traversed by a tripartite ontological hierarchy. As we take into consideration art - the second element of Plato’s aesthetics - we notice that, unlike Aristotle, far from being eminently *theoretical*, Plato’s relationship with it is in fact *practical*. This may be somewhat confusing at first since where Plato is concerned we are accustomed to use the term *ideal*; nonetheless, it is worth remembering that in this particular context the topic in question is not beauty, but *art* and that Plato regards art as a mean to *educate* the citizen of the State. As is well known, the source of Plato’s reflections can be found in his analysis of the effects that music and poetry have on the human being’s soul. This led him to dissent (at least in part and at a spiritually momentous time for the Greek world) from both Homer and Hesiod, namely those who had, through their verses, gifted the Greeks with the Olympians, the quintessential Pantheon. In Plato’s opinion, having *liberated* all human passions in his poetry, Homer has not been able to *establish* a state. By poetically emulating passions he has de facto *legitimately* enfranchised them from any hierarchical organization, that is to say they have become autonomous, able to self-establish. As a consequence, Homer cannot in any way compete with Plato for the hypothetical foundation of a State. Because they reproduce *objects*, which are imitations of ideas, in relation to power and educational purpose the poetical works cannot match dialectics’ ability to generate *truth* (as maintained by Socrates); at most, poetry can produce *simulacra*. Within the contrast among simulacra (product of imitation: *plural*) and truth (one and unique: *singular*) we encounter, in the *aesthetical-pedagogical* sphere, the outcome of the metaphysical foundations of the relationship between the one and the many: the many are perceived as illusion while only the one is ontologically true. Why? In a few words: because the
being is one and – according to Plato – the becoming does not extend beyond the appearance.

This last issue reveals the thread that connected Plato’s position to that of Pythagoras (which predated it) and that unfolded throughout the history of the Western world up until Vitruvius and the Renaissance: we are in the presence of an aesthetics of measure (or norm: Nomos). This structured and defined theoretical approach rejects the distinction between content and form and in such manner ensures that the application of measure, not the reproduction of measure, in the work of art (or handmade product) attains the highest level of authenticity. During the actual execution, the application of measure (the above mentioned firmly practical-pragmatical aspect of Platonism) casts any principle of distinction/distinguishability aside while exalting the metaphysical power of the One that ignores both history and becoming (a superior ignorance, we could say, where the becoming is always immediately referred back to the being). Plato’s insistence (constant albeit discontinuous, thus sometimes covert) on the centrality of the concepts of order and measure has the effect of mitigating the centrality of the distinction he makes between idea and copy, which is just as much fundamental from a metaphysical perspective. In fact, because they exist and act ubiquitously within reality, measure and order operate and contribute to parenthesize or eliminate the ontological distinction between copy and model. In light of Plato’s reflections, which can be mostly found in The Laws, imitation – both as principle and application – now finds voice and relevance not so much in the notion of reproduction (which implies the ontological debasement of the copy) but rather in the overall sense of the symbolic display in the work of art (or handmade product, in a broader sense) of the very same measure and order in all their metaphysical plenitude, so that the real becomes
ontologically connoted in every context and (hierarchical) level. Provided that the sentiment is a just one, Plato rehabilitates to some extent (therefore reintroduces into the being) the representation-display of the sensation which, as we all know, had been previously banned. It is not a merely subjective (and ephemeral) sensing but rather one of a permanent expression of justice, order, and measure – in other words, the harmoniously arranged and established existence of the citizen.

Because of historical and theoretical reasons that are not worth recalling at this time, and due to the abundance of material on the theme, it is possible to observe that during the five hundred or so years that separate Plato and Plotinus, as the latter’s position reclaimed the ontological superiority of that which shines within symmetry, it also engendered the obsolescence of the concepts of measure and symmetry. In particular, although Plotinus takes his cue from Plato’s theory of ideas, he redefines the fundamental and powerfully ontological idea of the “One” by calling it spirit. He also imparts on it the Aristotelian trait relating to form, the ability of the active principle to bring inner perfection to the product so that the spirit, in accordance with the Plotinian acceptation of the word, manifests itself as productive, formative and, ultimately, enthusiastically creative (namely: spiritually inspired). Plotinus often intentionally refutes the idea of the spontaneous and automatic juxtaposition of symmetry/proportion (on the one hand) and beauty (on the other hand) since he believes that the beautiful ought to be (only) simple. As Spirit, it is the One (hence, not composite, any which way one may think of composition) that radiates within the multiple. Plotinus’ metaphysical intent is clear: he wants the One to possess the sublime predicate of beauty where he considers sublime what ascends to unity by rising (and, by participation, allowing to rise) above the diversity (for this reason, Plotinus almost never
believes the sublime to be *in opposition* to the beautiful). If anything, with regard to *art* in the proper sense, Plotinus overlooks the problem of imitation in terms of its (Platonic) devaluation as he frequently emphasizes the character of truth in art. Although art remains forever interconnected with its own formative process, that process demonstrates how, as the artist operates on a *deficiency*, he attempts to fill it through the work of art and attains perfection by an *intuition* of beauty that does *not* primarily involve his sensitivity. Plotinus continues to favor the form-life which he believes manifests itself qualitatively *better* (in a superior manner) in *nature* with respect to the static form of the (work of) art. He postulates that the process of *ascent* (= Eros-passion) which Plato considered the idea’s spiritual purpose and that tended to *distance* itself from the sensitivity, now strives to re-claim such sensitivity under the mark of an enthusiasm which may have originated during the poetic-tragic-Homeric – therefore pre-philosophical (pre-Socratic) – period of Greek civilization. The main issue concerning the theoretical-cognitive aspect of Plotinus’ position might be summarized as follows: during beauty’s process of ascent, which inevitably entails the detachment from the phenomenon and its manifestation, the *knowledge* of the latter’s nature (as *information* circumscribed by and to the very same phenomenon, in other words, *scientifically* neutral-objective) is not heightened by the *act* of ascending. Quite the reverse, it becomes intangible in spite of being entirely opposed to the presumed objective neutrality of knowledge. This intangibility is nothing else than the ineffable which *aesthetics* has so often used as a source of sustenance.

The path that leads from Plotinus to Augustine appears quite spontaneously also on account of the fact that, as Baeumler cleverly observes,
Plotinus had already placed Plato’s doctrine of ideas to the service of an extraneous spirit. The relationship between man and spiritual world had been regarded as a sentimental relationship, one between nostalgic longing and love; keywords such as ‘return’ and ‘escape’ were linked precisely to this and could both be interpreted in Christian terms.\(^2\)

More to the point, on the one hand, Augustine ponders the issue of beauty by replacing the Plotinian *Nous* with the Christian personal God and while doing so he emphasizes the increasing significance of the *interiority* of the soul’s spiritual afflatus and its direct relationship with God (that resulted in the devaluation of *nature* and *flesh*). However, on the other hand, as he reaffirms from an aesthetics perspective the concepts of symmetry and measure-number, he is able to make a journey peculiarly opposite to the one Plotinus had previously embarked on. In this regard, Baeumler writes,

> «Plotinus had ascended above sensible beauty to the One, as beauty’s source. Augustine progresses from the representation of a superior beauty to the concept of beauty, from there to the concept of form, then to the concept of measure, and finally to the concept of rightful relationship (rhythm). Under the guide of the concept of order, he traces his steps back to the phenomenon»\(^3\).

Therefore, while Augustine holds his rightful place alongside Pseudo-Dionysius as “intermediary” for the medieval theory of beauty, Aristotle establishes himself as the medieval source of the theory of art.

The charm of Plato’s theory of beauty has not been equally bestowed on Aristotle’s theory of art in spite of the fact that

\(^2\) Baeumler, *Aesthetik*, 27.

\(^3\) Ivi, 30.
it aspired, just as much as Plato’s idea of beauty, to the knowledge of the being. Moreover, although the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* have played a pivotal role in the centuries that followed their composition, it should be noted—again through Baeumler—that Aristotle has introduced a strong theoretical countertrend with respect to the idea that only beautiful art can and must exist. This is because his works show no theoretical footprint that would allow us to make a distinction between art, intended in the broadest of terms, and beautiful art (even less in a modern connotation). To the contrary, it is conceivable that the missing fragments of his works, too, may reveal that his interest did not lie in the beautiful per se, but in art and its manifold acceptations. It is easier to understand several aspects of Aristotle’s doctrine if we consider that Plotinus refers to him with regard to the relationship form (*èidos*) matter (*yle*). However, while Aristotle places those concepts in connection with the form of the being and with the being as form, Plotinus transposes them to a mystical plane. It is not by chance that Aristotle is likely to be the first to conceive the being as an organism and consequently formulates an aesthetical definition (related to the entities) that is more ontological than metaphysical. In actuality, contextualizing Aristotle’s aesthetics is relatively easy. Matter (*yle*) is such only in relation to a formative-organizing reality (*èidos*); in nature, the organism produces and elaborates by itself, autonomously—hence in itself—the relationship between matter and form. Quite the reverse, in an artificial reality, namely that of art (of production) in the wider sense (and, as we have seen, not limited to beautiful art) form is not inherent in the product but, as image-project, it is so in the soul of the realizer-producer, irrespective of the kind of (artistic) product. It is well known that Aristotle’s concept of soul was quite different from Plato’s and was subject to become, over the centuries, what we have come to informally call soul-mind.
The affinity between the products of nature and those of art is still alive in him and has remained unchanged over time despite the unbalanced fluctuation between two poles: nature and art. As a result, in the last years of the eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth century, while Schelling’s philosophy of art highlighted the superiority of the formative-productive (genial) singularity of nature over the less direct-spontaneous formative quality of art, Hegel’s expunged natural production from the artistic (spiritual) context. Before them, Goethe and Schiller, albeit still under the influence of Plato and Plotinus, had already determined Aristotle’s concept of organism to be an essential point of reference for their own works. Moreover, the translation of the term tèchne into ars is entirely Aristotelian. The fundamental issue is the inductive element of the art of poetry which in the opinion of Aristotle should not be considered inferior to the deductive. As a matter of fact, in all its importance, the inductive element justifies the omitted distinction (within the Aristotelian framework) between artisan/artist and between creations that are designed for use without these being deemed tout court incompatible with delight. In substance, Aristotle conceives that one can operate artistically by acting either in terms of what nature is not able to accomplish on its own, or in terms of the ability of the work of art to imitate nature. In his view, imitation is primarily accordance with its (ordering and formal) finality. Ultimately, it is worth mentioning that Aristotle does not contemplate the imitation of beauty since beauty, per se, is what conforms to its own ontological condition (perfection/accomplishment). His position on concepts such as measure, symmetry, and proportion (in the work of art) does not differ much from that of Plato; this is also true with regard to the educational role of art and of music in particular.
The benefit of this concise and unquestionably stylized reconstruction of the history of the aesthetics issue – or of aesthetics as issue – is circumscribed to the question that resides in the title and to the purpose of these reflections. If we follow the main points of the path Baeumler traced in 1934, we cannot but agree with what he considered to be its epilogue,

«starting from the foundations established by Plato – Baeumler writes – the metaphysics of beauty and the theory of art have been running parallel to each other by either diverging or converging [...] Both tendencies reached their apex during the “aesthetical” XVIII century [...]»

Said apex consists in the so-called inauguration of aesthetics as an autonomous, and then special philosophical discipline, which found further outcome in the system of arts (the hierarchical yet fluid organization of the arts) and in the idealistic philosophy of art (the interpretation of the development of art from the viewpoint of the philosophy of history). The implicit Platonism remained ensconced in the aesthetical ideas that characterized the Middle Ages, the Renaissance humanism, and the seventeenth century until it reached the above mentioned apex in the eighteenth century when it resurfaced

«from the negation of the autonomous existence of the beautiful or of the artistic work of art. If, in fact, absolute beauty exists and everything else is only a shadow of it, then what harmonically manifests itself is merely the appearance of reality»

The growing popularity of the idea of a natural genius-talent and of its spontaneous creativity in the artistic act, characteristic of the eighteenth century, on the one hand contributes to

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4 Ivi, 85.
5 Ibidem.
emphasize the natural-spontaneous creation upon the technical-artificial while, on the other hand, it enhances the role of the artist as the chosen human equivalent of nature’s spontaneous creation. It is also true that this opens the debate (or better, it continues on a different level) over taste and genius (often intended as unruliness-folly). Even more importantly and contrary to what is generally believed, this contention does not find resolution in the German Romantik as it confuses Romanticism with the theory of the genius/sublime, but rather in the last offshoots of the Sturm und Drang which were still extant and active in the Romantic era. Such a distinction may appear to be the result of an analysis conducted within the framework of the Central European theories of aesthetics in the period spanning the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In reality, it becomes of paramount importance at a time when the Romantic (truly Romantic) conception of symbol mitigates the subjectivistic component of the artistic act, which is still present in the heritage of the eighteenth century, and exposes aesthetics to its own conclusion, an end that perhaps – as we suggested in the beginning – was also its ultimate end.

It is evident that what I have just referred to as the Romantic concept of symbol is predicated on opinions which had been expounded by a number of poets and thinkers starting with Goethe and Schiller and encompassing their contemporary interlocutors. However, I believe that the main issue remains that which I mentioned above: through its implicit symbolic overture towards nature and history, the Romantic symbol places man, nature, and history in a harmonious yet tragic relationship. It does so by embracing the development – hence, the becoming – without causing the latter to morph into an upward evolution. It also effectively prevents the moment of contrast-conflict among the spiritual forces that confront one another in its pres-
ence from being simplistically considered infinite. Conversely, each work of art is a truce, a beautiful armistice. As a result, nature and history as well as empirical evidence and theory— but mostly paganism and Christianity—engage in an unprecedented dialogue replete with palingenetic expectation and preparation for a new era, quite different from the overly abstract ideal of humanity that had prevailed up until that moment. Thus, the Romantic thought arises as the paradigm of a way of human existence which greatly transcends the limitations of a new kind of aesthetic canon. Referring the Romantik back to the arbitrary and subjective manifestation of sentimentalism—that Hegel had introduced in his Phenomenology of Spirit and that, one century later, Carl Schmitt transported onto the plane of political science—demonstrates to what extent the traditional philosophical thought had considered the Romantic movement dangerous. The reason for this distrust is the alleged effort to free aesthetics from its disciplinary constraints in order to transform it into a philosophy of life in an ontological sense. As a result, it becomes acceptable to maintain that the beginning of the end of aesthetics coincides with the Romantik, and that its actual end happens through Nietzsche’s opposition to the Romantik itself. Contrary to what is often suggested, such an end does not result from Nietzsche’s opposition to Wagner, but rather from his philosophical misstep in deeming the Dionysian to be ontologically anti-romantic on account of it being anti-metaphysical. As a matter of fact, the Romantic symbol was already anti-metaphysical in as much as it had encompassed, in the symbolic time of the being (the so-called symbolism of history), the becoming and its regenerating breath by often calling it with its proper name: Dionysius. Still, unlike the Romantics, Nietzsche releases Dionysius from his relationship (which was instead romantically ineffaceable) with the supersensible as the invisible signifying
thread of the sensible world. However, this only resulted in him delivering existence to the paradigmatic senselessness and will to power of a subjectivity that is not only uncertain, but also void of those modalities capable of answering for the artistic act of the power. Thus, Nietzsche’s destruction of the symbol marks the end of the *Romantik* but not that of aesthetics, which had not reached its conclusion since its *ultimate end* had not yet been able to manifest itself as its end (conclusion).

Such an event appears in Heidegger’s philosophy. It may seem that Heidegger advocates the rejection of aesthetics, which was typical of his times and espoused by other phenomenological and *lebensphilosophisch* philosophers based on the assumption that the (re)evaluation of the *Erlebnis* may cause the overestimation — again, the vulgate — of the subjective and individualistic element in the creation-reception of the work of art as well as in the artistic-aesthetical expression. In reality, Heidegger’s opposition to the notion of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline of metaphysical origin predates (almost from an Aristotelian perspective, we might say) his rejection of the aesthetics of *Erlebnis*. His notion of *Da-Sein* (being-there), which had its foundations in phenomenology, evokes a spiritually Romantic overture towards the overcoming of the Nietzschean repudiation of the symbol. The issue is certainly quite complex and can only be approached in broad outlines. However, it should be emphasized that we are not trying to (re)define Heidegger as the last *Romantic*. The real question is instead, “Is Heidegger’s hostility towards aesthetics a continuation of or a departure from Nietzsche’s antithetical position towards the symbol?” There is no doubt that the two shared the same kind of anti-Platonic and anti-metaphysical intransigence. Yet, when in the early 1930s Heidegger manifested his preference for Hölderlin, Nietzsche became a great adversary, an adversary next to whom he had once walked but that
it was now necessary to challenge. As I have extensively, and on many occasions\(^6\), addressed the contrast between Heidegger and Nietzsche, I see no need to return to the matter. However, that contrast had a fundamental impact on the issue of the end (conclusion/purpose) of aesthetics. Indeed, Heidegger considers the Nietzschean triad, Dionysian-art-will to power, the herald (and possible realization) of the culmination of Western metaphysics. The Heideggerian gamble on the Séynsgeschichte, and on the role that Hölderlin played in it, ultimately prevailed – a predominance that Heidegger explicitly associated with his notion of interpretation. The reason for writing his in cursive concerns, whether we admit it or not, the privileged connection that Heidegger (obsessively?) recognized between Hölderlin’s Da-Sein and his own\(^7\). In so far as the subjectivity of both poet and thinker is referred to the Sein, their respective (historical-essential) Da assumes the form of the unfinished work of art (Hölderlin) and of the interpreter who brings it to completion (Heidegger). This is why I have often suggested that without the Heideggerian interpretation Hölderlin’s work “would not” exist. It stands to reason that I am not referring to “work” in the historical and

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\(^7\) Cfr. M. HEIDEGGER, *Zur Ueberwindung der Aesthetik. Zu “Ursprung des Kunstwerks”*, hrsg. V. F.-E. von Herrmann, in *Heidegger Studies* 6 (1990), 5-7: «[...] entscheidend ist: wie nach dem Werk maßgebend gefragt und wie nach Schaffen und Bewahren gefragt wird!». In this brief note dating back to the years of his public lecture, we find clearly expounded the meaning of Heidegger’s interpreting. His (Heidegger’s) Da-Seyn is the wie, the how, namely the existential disposition, the Stimmung. Interpretation is the outcome of said Stimmung, which because of its extreme nature, ceases to be existentially individual-personal and acquires instead a universal-human trait.
literary meaning of the word, but to the one which inhabits the plane of the encounter (certainly destinal) between Heidegger and Hölderlin’s respective *Da-Sein* and that we do not know for sure it actually ever existed. In Heidegger’s judgement, with the decline of both philosophy (metaphysics) and mission of the philosophical thought, not only the era of traditional philosophy is drawing to an end, but also that of a configuration of the human being (*Da-Sein*) whose fulcrum, whose existential core is eventually destined to fluctuate between technique and poetry. Hence, the end of aesthetics is both an essential element for the end of metaphysics as traditional philosophy, and the realization-fulfillment of the tension which has historically (=in a destinal manner) inspired humanity to seek beauty (harmony, symmetry, and form) thereby *releasing* inwardly or outwardly the Dionysian force of the end (whether historically perceived or not).